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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
the trial evidence was produced which would have been sufficient for conviction
cannot alter this result. 24 Secondly, where defendant properly moves for a dismissal of the indictment which should have been granted, a subsequent plea
of guilty to a lesser charge shall be considered as null and void. 25
ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR PLEA OF GUILTY To TRAFFIC INFRACTION IN

SUB-

SEQUENT CIVIL ACTION.

May a defendant's prior plea of guilt to a traffic offense be introduced as
evidence of his carelessness in a civil action for damages?
This was precisely the question the Court of Appeals was faced with in
Ando v. Woodberr98 and it was one of first impression in that Court.
Upon the trial plaintiff sought to prove the plea of guilty by the defendant
on the ground that such plea was an admission against interest but the trial
court excluded the proffered evidence, 27 and such exclusion was upheld by the
Appellate Division.2 8 However, the Court of Appeals held otherwise, stating
that the defendant's prior plea of guilty to the traffic offense should have been
29
received as evidence of his asserted negligence.
It has been held in lower courts of this state that evidence of conviction
on a plea of guilty to violation of traffic laws is admissible against the defendant
in a civil action. The reasoning is that in such a case the record or proof of
the defendant's plea of guilty is received not as a judgment establishing a fact
or truth of the facts in support of the charge of negligence, but as a declaration
or admission against interest. 30
"All facts showing rational probative value are admissible unless there
is sound reason to exclude them, unless, that is, some specific rule forbids." 31
Is there any justification for excluding the prior plea of guilty to a traffic
infraction?
The defendant claimed there was, arguing that there is a public policy
which requires the court to treat the admission implicit in pleading guilty to
a traffic offense differently from others. He stated that a plea of guilt is
entered in traffic court for numerous reasons unrelated to guilt. It was contended that one charged with a traffic violation pleads guilty, even though he
believes himself innocent, in order to avoid the expenditure of time and money
24. People v. Nitzberg, 289 N.Y. 523, 47 N.E.2d 37 (1-943).
25. People v. Chirieleison, 3 N.Y.2d 170, 164 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1957). Here defendant,
indicted for robbery in the first degree, moved for a dismissal of the indictment because
of undue delay. It was denied. He pleaded guilty to petty larceny and appealed. The
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment.
26. 8 N.Y.2d 165, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1960).
27. 15 Misc. 2d 774, 181 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
28. 9 A.D.2d 125, 192 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1st Dep't 1959).
29. Supra note 26.
30. Stanton v. Major, 274 App. Div. 864, 82 N.Y.S.2d 134 (3d Dep't 1948); Same
v. Davison, 253 App. Div. 123, 1 N.Y.S.2d 374 (4th Dep't 1937); McDowell v. Birchett,
Misc. -, 126 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
31. WVigmore, Evidence 293 (3d ed. 1940).
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which would be involved if guilt were denied and the charge contested. In
effect, it is urged that such plea amounts to one of nolo contendere.
For additional support of his public policy argument, the defendant
relied heavily on Section 2(29) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and the case of
Walther v. News Syndicate Co.3
Section 2(29) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law states:
A traffic infraction is not a crime and the penalty or punishment
imposed therefor ... shall not affect credibility as a witness or otherwise, of any person convicted thereof.
It was the defendant's contention that this Section establishes a public
policy against the use of evidence of a traffic infraction for any purpose in a
subsequent civil action. However, the Court pointed out that this Section is
directed solely against.the use of a conviction of a traffic offense to affect or
impair credibility as a witness of the person convicted and not against the
use of the plea as evidence in chief.
Walther v. News Syndicate Co.33 was concerned with the admission of a
prior conviction for a traffic infraction after trial on a not guilty plea. The
Court held that such conviction was not admissible against a defendant in a
civil suit arising out of the same occurrence. The Court felt that the statute,34
protecting a witness against disclosure of his conviction for a traffic infraction
to affect his credibility, is an expression of public policy having some bearing
on the right of the plaintiff in his civil action to disclose to the jury that the
defendant had been found guilty of a traffic infraction in connection with the
very accident underlying the civil suit.
It was on this reasoning that the defendant relies so heavily in the case
at bar. However, the Court in the Walther case made a distinction between
admission of a prior conviction or a plea of not guilty and admission of a
conviction on a plea of guilty. The opinion supports, rather than detracts
from the conclusion that a guilty plea deliberately recorded by the defendant
is admissible against him on the issue of his negligence in a subsequent civil
action.
In effect, the defendant is arguing that when he pleaded guilty he "really
didn't mean what he said." However, this claim is one that goes to the weight
of the evidence and the effect of such evidence is to be determined by the jury.
Such a claim should not cause the evidence to be excluded.
In reality, there is probably a great deal of truth to the claim that a plea
of guilt is entered in traffic court for numerous reasons unrelated to guilt, but
if the prospective defendant is going to take the easy way out for the sake
of convenience, he does so at his own risk. He has the opportunity to contest
the charge. If he chooses not to do so, why should he be allowed to contest
32. 276 App. Div. 169, 93 N.Y.S.2d 537 (lst Dep't 1949).
33. Ibid.
34. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 2(29) (now § 155); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 355.
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his own admission of guilt in a subsequent civil action arising out of the same
occurrence? The use of the conviction in the subsequent action is the price
he may have to pay for such convenience.
REVOCATION OF OPERATOR'S L ICENSE

Under the authority vested in him by the New York Vehicle and Traffic
Law Section 71(2)(b), 3 5 the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles revoked respondent's driver's license following a Massachusetts conviction for driving
"under the influence." Since this determination was made without a hearing
it was subject to, judicial review. 36 This review resulted in the trial court
annulling the revocation.3 7 After an Appellate Division affirmance, 38 the Court
of Appeals, in Sullivan v. Kelly,39 unanimously reversed the lower courts, upholding the Commissioner's determination to revoke.
The respondent felt the Commissioner lacked adequate grounds upon
which to revoke the license. The revocation was based upon three documents
before the Commissioner: (1) A copy of the notice of suspension addressed
to the respondent by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles in Massachusetts which
labeled the conviction as one of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; (2) a letter from the Massachusetts Registrar
to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles in New York; and (3) a certified abstract
of the Massachusetts court record which identified the respondent as the party
involved and stated the offense as "operating under the influence."
None of these documents mentioned the Massachusetts statute under
which respondent was convicted. The respondent contended that New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 71 (2) (b) was not operative without identification of the Massachusetts statute. He also contended that the copy of the
court record was the only document which the Commissioner could consider,
claiming that the notice of suspension and the letter from the Massachusetts
Registrar lacked probative value and were unreliable sources for supplying the
essentials required to justify revocation. On the basis of the court record
abstract alone, the offense was labeled as "operating under the influence." This
document, coupled with the absence of the Massachusetts statute, was, the
respondent felt, inconclusive enough to prevent the Commissioner from acting
under Section 71.
To substantiate his position the respondent referred to Moore v. Macduff,40 where only the statute under which the driver was convicted was con35. Now § 510 of the N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law:
...

licenses must be revoked .

.

. where the holder is convicted . . . (of) an

offense consisting of operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor where the conviction was had outside this state; ....
36. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 510(6).
37. Sullivan v. Kelly, 16 Misc. 2d 699, 184 N.YS.2d 310 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
38. 9 A.D.2d 865, 194 N.Y.S.2d 460 (4th Dep't 1959).
39. 7 N.Y.2d 462, 199 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1960).
40. 309 N.Y. 35, 127 NXE.2d 741 (1955).

